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Non-Cash Benefits and the Distribution of Economic Welfare
*
 
Non-cash benefits can have substantial effects on the distribution of economic welfare. 
Standard approaches to the inclusion of non-cash benefits in broader measures of resources 
have failed to take adequate account of the pattern of needs associated with the greater use 
of health and education services. Our results, for Ireland in the year 2000, show that it is 
possible to derive more appropriate measures of total resources than have been derived 
using standard methods. The results indicate that the greatest impact comes from the 
inclusion of imputed rent for owner occupation as part of the resource measure. When this is 
done, the rate of “resource poverty” for older people is substantially reduced, in line with 
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* This paper builds on research undertaken as part of a project on Accurate Income Measurement for 
the Assessment of Policy, funded under the Sixth Framework Programme. We are grateful to 
colleagues in this project for helpful comments, and to participants at an ESRI seminar in February 
2008. 1. Introduction 
Studies of income distribution and inequality are based, for the most part, on cash 
incomes. Cash incomes, however, are only a partial measure of the resources that 
generate economic welfare. Non-cash incomes from different sources are substantial 
in aggregate terms, and vary widely across the population in a given country. 
Furthermore, the issue of non-cash income can be particularly important when 
undertaking comparisons between countries as the extent and nature of goods and 
services provided free or at subsidised rates can differ greatly from one country to 
another.  
 
In this paper we re-examine the ways in which studies of economic inequality have 
taken non-cash resources into account. A number of influential studies follow a 
measurement approach which values the benefit of a non-cash service at the cost of its 
provision. This tracks the use of resources attributable to different individuals and 
households. However, the results on resource use are then interpreted as measuring 
the economic welfare of the households concerned. We argue that this is not 
appropriate, as it fails to take into account differences in need which are strongly 
associated with the variation in resources. We propose alternative measures which are 
applied to Irish data (from the Living in Ireland Survey, 2000). Our analysis covers 
three of the largest sources of in-kind income:  
•  imputed rent arising from owner-occupied housing 
•  benefits arising from free health services; and  
•  benefits arising from state-provided or subsidised education.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews key studies on 
the impact of non-cash resources on inequality, and points to the importance of 
keeping the end-goal of improving the measure of welfare in mind when deciding on 
the measurement approach. Sections 3, 4 and 5 deal with the issues involved in 
applying this approach in an Irish context. Section 3 covers the inclusion of imputed 
rent for owner-occupiers; Section 4 deals with the inclusion of  health services; and 
Section 5 deals with issues arising in the inclusion of education. Section 6 combines 
these analyses to provide a resource measure including cash incomes, imputed rent, 
health services and education. The main findings are drawn together in Section 7. 
--  32. Conceptual and measurement issues 
Standard practice in the analysis of the distributional impact of publicly provided 
services is based on two key assumptions (see, for example, Jones (2006), Marical et 
al. (2006) and Smeeding et al. (1993)): 
1.  The analysis of incidence is conducted on a static basis, and excludes 
externalities
1 
2.  The value of the transfer to the beneficiary is assumed to be equal to the 
average cost of producing the relevant service. 
Each of these assumptions has been questioned in the literature. For example, 
Smeeding et al (1993) note that the average cost of provision may overstate the value 
of the non-cash benefit, as recipients might, if they had the corresponding cash 
amount instead, prefer to spend some of it on other goods and services. O’Higgins 
(1981) provides an illustration of a further difficulty with the “cost per capita” 
method. If, for example, education benefits were measured on the basis of the cost of 
provision, then a rise in the wages of teachers would lead to a higher estimate of the 
value of the service to the individual. But under these circumstances, the “output” of 
the service could be unchanged, so that there would be no real gain to the beneficiary, 
despite the rise in the benefit as measured by the “cost per capita” approach. A further 
consideration, somewhat countering the first, is that economies of scale may mean 
that services purchased “in bulk” by the state are less costly that what individuals 
could purchase in the market – in which case the value could be greater than under the 
cost of provision approach. 
 
Despite such criticisms, the attribution of benefit based on cost of provision has 
remained very common in this literature. There are, however, even more fundamental 
criticisms of the standard approach to which we now turn, and with which we try to 
deal in our empirical work. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Put another way, it is assumed that the only recipients of the relevant service benefit from it (though 
this may improve the household’s position)– and that  provision of the service does not create any 
benefits or losses to the non-recipients (e.g., through tax financing – so it is assumed that the taxes 
financing the transfers are already in place). 
--  4In the case of public health care subsidies the imputation of non-cash income is often 
based on a risk-related insurance approach. Each individual is be assumed to receive a 
benefit from the state determined by the average spending on his/her age-sex group,
2 
irrespective of what use was actually made of public health services. This approach 
(used by Saunders et al (1994), Donaldson et al (2002) and Garfinkel et al (2004)) can 
be seen as an estimate of an actuarially fair insurance premium. These benefits are 
then added to cash incomes to provide a broader measure of resources.  
 
An insurance based approach is seen as preferable to one based on the actual use of 
services, under which the greatest benefit would be attributed to those who make 
greatest use of health services. An “actual use” approach would imply the individuals 
who are most often and most severely ill, and in need of health services, could have 
“total resources” many times greater than their cash incomes. The implication, when 
basing studies of distribution on such a measure would be that many very ill 
individuals would be ranked as higher in the distribution of “total resources” than 
their healthy counterparts. While this makes sense in terms of tracking the use of 
resources, it is not appropriate in terms of measuring welfare: it would not be 
reasonable to describe a person as ‘better off’ because they were sick and in need of 
medical treatment which they received for free. Studies of income and resource 
distribution aim to rank individuals in terms of welfare, and already take account of 
the needs of households of different sizes and compositions by means of adult 
equivalence scales. When health resources are taken into account, corresponding 
needs in terms of health must also be brought into the analysis. 
Does the “insurance-based” approach manage to overcome this critique?  We argue, 
following Radner (1997), that it does not. The insurance based approach, when linked 
to age, means that benefits vary sharply according to age group. Again, this is because 
health status and health service usage are closely linked to age.
3 While there is some 
“smoothing” compared to the actual use approach, the fundamental point remains. 
                                                 
2 Adjustments may also be made  with respect to the socio-economic group of the individual, or taking 
into account particular institutional features of the public health system and its interaction with private 
sector provision of health services and insurance. 
3 For present purposes, it does not matter whether this is a pure age gradient, or linked to intensive care 
in the year or two before death. 
--  5Radner points out the inconsistency between income and needs when it comes to 
attributing non-cash resources to individuals. For example, the inclusion of Medicare 
in the income of the aged can result in an upward bias of their economic status. He 
also the equivalence scale (reflecting needs) used for cash income may not be 
appropriate when non-cash income is included in the definition of resources, as the 
receipt of non-cash incomes may be associated with particular needs. He concludes 
that failure to adjust the equivalence scale to take account of additional needs tends to 
overestimate the economic status of the aged. The equivalence scales estimated by 
Jones and O’Donnell (1995) for those with a disability carry a similar implication – 
the needs of those with a disability are greater, so their cash and non-cash resources 
would need to be adjusted to take this into account for welfare comparison purposes. 
 
Parallel arguments can be applied in the case of education. If non-cash incomes are 
assigned on the basis of cost of provision in respect of each pupil or student in first-, 
second- and third-level education, then the relative position of families with children 
appears to improve. But the adult equivalence scales generally used do not take into 
account children’s need for education. This is eminently reasonable, given that in 
most industrial economies, education is both compulsory and free, at least up to the 
mid-teens. How then should equivalence scales be adjusted to take into account 
children’s need for education? One approach would be that for the years in which 
education is compulsory and free, children have a need for education which is equal 
to that provided by the free system. On this basis, state subsidies for the compulsory 
education years would not be seen as improving the relative welfare of students or 
their families. But state subsidies to post-compulsory education (in upper second level 
and third level) would affect relative welfare. 
 
What of results based on the standard approach? Here we limit our focus to the UK 
and Ireland. In the UK, Evandrou et al. (1992) use U.K. data and looks at public 
spending on education, health services and subsidies to local authority housing. They 
find that the three benefits combined are worth most in the middle of the distribution 
with education being mildly ‘pro-rich’, particularly that of tertiary education. Sefton 
(2002) estimates the ‘social wage’ for the U.K. using 1996/97 and 2000/01 data and 
compares it to 1979. It shows that poorer households receive a greater proportion of 
--  6welfare non-cash benefits than richer households and the ‘pro-poor bias’ has 
increased over time. This has not succeeded in reducing inequality however.  
 
In the Irish context, there are a number of studies based on the standard “cost of 
provision” approach, applied inter alia to health and education. O’Connell (1982) 
looked at the tax-benefit system in Ireland, including non-cash benefits such as 
education, housing, food subsidies and free public transport. In general it was seen to 
be progressive with households with more than two adults and children benefiting the 
most. Educational benefits were found to be regressive however. Nolan (1981) also 
looked at the Irish system and found that the value of non-cash benefits (such as 
medical services, housing and education) appeared relatively stable across income 
groups falling only marginally as income rose. This contrasted with cash benefits, 
which favoured lower income households. Rottman and Reidy (1988) examined the 
redistributive effect of government spending on areas such as education, housing and 
health during the 1970s.  They found that spending on healthcare became more 
redistributive over the 1970s. Primary education expenditure in the 1970s was found 
to be redistributive but third level spending was strongly regressive, particularly in 
universities compared to other third level institutions.  Regarding housing, the benefit 
associated with the provision of local authority housing became more progressive 
over the seventies – in part because of the self-selection involved in tenant purchase 
schemes. 
 
Nolan and Russell (2001) look at a range of non-cash benefits in Ireland, including 
the ‘free schemes’ such as free travel,  free electricity etc.  They found that the 
medical card scheme was strongly concentrated towards the bottom end of the 
distribution with 61 per cent of medical card spending going towards the bottom 30 
per cent of the income distribution. 
 
Our results, provided in the following sections, are based on a different approach to 
the estimation of benefits, with a careful eye to the overall implications for economic 
welfare, and for a more recent period. The dataset used is the Living in Ireland survey 
for the year 2000.  It is the Irish component of the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP). The baseline quintiles are constructed using equivalised, disposable 
--  7income. The equivalence scale used is the modified OCED equivalence scale which 
attributes a value of 1 to the first adult, .5 to subsequent adults and .3 for children. 
 
Regarding inequality and poverty measures we report the Gini coefficient, the 
Atkinson index with inequality aversion parameters set at 0.5 and 1.5  and the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke poverty indices (FGT). The Gini is the ratio of the gap between the 
Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality (45 degree line) to the entire area under 
the 45 degree line. It is bounded between 0 and 1, 0 corresponding to perfect equality, 
1 corresponding to perfect inequality. A fall in the Gini therefore signifies a fall in 
inequality.  The Atkinson indices are also measures of inequality but have the added 
advantage of being a normative measure through the choice of epsilon, which allows a 
greater weight to be given to different parts of the income distribution. We use 0.5 
and 1.5 as our values of epsilon, 0.5 is more sensitive to changes at the upper end of 
the income distribution, 1.5 to the lower end of the income distribution. Moving on to 
the FGT poverty measures, the FGT 0 is the head count index of poverty and tells us 
the percentage of people with incomes below the poverty line. The FGT 1 is a 
measure of the poverty gap ratio, combining information about the extent and the 
depth of poverty i.e., . how far people fall below the poverty line. Finally, the FGT 2 
measures is a “depth and distribution sensitive” measure, which gives greater weight 
to those who with incomes furthest below the poverty line. 
 
 
3. Imputed rent from owner occupation 
Housing represents a substantial element of household wealth, and households that 
own their own accommodation have an income advantage over those that have to pay 
rent. As part of our investigation of aspects of non-cash income, therefore, we seek to 
adjust income measures to take into account the “imputed rent” enjoyed by owner-
occupiers. One method used for such adjustment is the ‘before housing costs’ and 
‘after housing costs’ measures of income, as used in the UK’s official analyses of 
poverty and income distribution (Households Below Average Income) and by Fahy et 
al. (2004). Expenditure on rent and mortgages is deducted from household income, 
doing away with the need to estimate the “imputed income” derived from owning 
your own house mortgage free or receiving rent subsidies. While this method has the 
--  8merit of simplicity, and can be used to identify some of the key features, it fails to 
take account of the fact that households vary in the strength of their  preferences for 
housing, so that a post-housing costs measure is also an imperfect measure of welfare. 
 
Census data show high rates of home ownership in Ireland. As a result, the issue of 
imputed rent from owner occupation is particularly important in an Irish context. 
Within the Living in Ireland Survey for 2000 almost 85% of people in the sample are 
living in owner-occupied accommodation (whether owned outright or owned with a 
mortgage).  
 
Frick and Grabka (2003) identify three methods for calculating imputed rent  
¾  The capital market approach 
¾  The market rent approach  
¾  The opportunity cost approach  
Frick and Grabka assess the three approaches, and conclude that the opportunity cost 
method offers significant advantages. In the Irish context, the dominance of owner 
occupation as a mode of tenure and the size of the sample (3,463 households) means 
that there are just 114 (unweighted) cases of private sector rented households on 
which the opportunity cost method depends to establish relationships between 
indicator variables and market rents. This would be a rather shaky basis on which to 
construct empirical estimates. By contrast, information on the capital value of the 
house is gained for more than 80% of the sample. In these circumstances it seems 
prudent to apply the capital market approach and it is this approach we use here. The 
value of the house is self assessed by the head of the household. If no figure is given 
we use the interviewer estimate of the house value. From this we deduct the 
outstanding mortgage value if the house is not owned outright. Callan (1992) found 
that self-assessed values corresponded well with interviewer estimates of housing 
values. Table 1 reports the distribution of housing values of owner-occupied housing 
as of 2000. The second column shows the total housing value, the third column shows 
the housing value net of the outstanding mortgage amount (net equity). We see that 
house values rise with income. We use an imputed rent of 3% of the homeowner’s net 
equity in the property, following the procedures of Frick and Grabka. The fact that 
owner occupation is the predominant mode of tenure means that analysing just owner-
--  9occupiers will capture about 90 per cent of the total impact of imputed rent across all 
tenures.  
 
Table 1: Average Housing Values by Quintile 
Quintile House Value Net Equity
1 69,215  63,661
2 98,642  90,871
3 121,941  110,584
4 155,773  140,832
5 185,783  162,556
All 126,390  113,807
 
Figure 1 shows the average house prices within and outside of Dublin from 2000 on. 
We can see large growth in the average house price since 2000. 2000 house prices in 
Dublin stood at 57 per cent of the 2007 value and 74 per cent of the 2007 value for 
houses outside of Dublin. Since then, there have been sharp falls in house prices, 
continuing at the time of writing. It seems likely, therefore, that house values in 2000 
were closer to a long-run sustainable level, and are therefore a suitable basis for the 
estimation of the impact of imputed rent on resource distribution. 
 
































Source: Permanent TSB/ESRI House Price Index
 
--  10Table 2 shows the income shares by quintile of disposable income per adult 
equivalent before (column 2) and after (column 3) imputed rent is considered. The 
income share of the lowest and middle quintiles increase with a fall in the income 
share at the top of the income scale.  We can see from the last column that the 
percentage increase in equivalised disposable income is largest for the bottom quintile 
and decreases as we move up the income distribution. 
4
 








% Change in Equivalised Disposable 
Income
1 7.8%  8.2% 17.4% 
2 12.9%  12.9% 12.2% 
3 17.9%  18.0% 10.1% 
4 23.6%  23.5% 10.0% 
5 37.8%  37.4% 8.0% 
Total 100%  100% 10.1% 
 
 
Table 3 shows the effects on various measures of inequality (the Gini coefficient, and 
the Atkinson index with values of 0.5 and 1.5) and relative income poverty (the Foster 
Greer Thorbecke indices of the head count, poverty gap ratio, and their distribution 
sensitive measure, all evaluated at 60 per cent of median income per adult 
equivalent)
5. All the inequality indices show a fall, albeit no more than 3 per cent in 
the case of the Gini, which is particularly sensitive to changes in the middle of the 
                                                 
4 Some measure of the impact of capital gains from the appreciation of housing over periods of strong 
price growth could be gained from using a higher rate of return. Similar patterns are observed with a 
higher rate of return to housing of 5%. Imputed rent then forms almost 17% of average income, and 
close to 30% of the initial cash income of the bottom quintile. 
5 This is the cut-off given most prominence in the EU’s Laeken indicators; in EU terminology it is the 
“at risk of poverty” indicator. 
5 This is the cut-off given most prominence in the EU’s Laeken indicators; in EU terminology it is the 
“at risk of poverty” indicator. The equivalence scale is 1 for the first adult in a household, .5 for other 
adults, and .3 for children. 
 
--  11distribution. But the Atkinson measure with the index of 1.5, and the poverty 
measures (FGT) are more sensitive to changes at the bottom of the distribution and 
show a greater fall – of between 11 and 15 per cent in the case of the FGT indices.  
 
Table 3: Impact of Imputed Rent on Inequality of Resources 





plus imputed rent Change
Gini 0.302  0.293  -3.0%
Atkinson 0.5  0.074  0.070  -6.0%
Atkinson 1.5  0.247  0.219  -11.5%
FGT0 (poverty head count)  0.219  0.194  -11.4%
FGT1 (poverty gap ratio)  0.053  0.046  -13.3%
FGT2 (depth and distribution 
sensitive measure)  0.019 0.016  -14.8%
 
 
4. Health services and the distribution of economic welfare 
In 2000, the year to which the data refer, total Irish healthcare spending stood at 6.3% 
of GDP. A brief description of the system is needed as a context for our analysis.  
Hospital care was free to all except for a statutory charge of €33 per night up to a 
maximum of €330 over 12 months. Low income individuals and families with 
incomes below specified limits were entitled to a medical card. Medical card holders 
obtained receive extra services (such as GP consultations and prescription drugs) free 
of charge and did not have to pay for hospital treatment. General practitioner costs are 
not covered by the State if the person does not have a medical card. The drugs 
payment scheme, introduced in 1999, meets the cost of prescription medicine above a 
certain monthly rate which the household must bear themselves. In 2000 this rate 
stood at just over €53 per month. Private health insurance cover was available, and 
premia for health insurance were eligible for tax relief. Medical costs not covered by 
health insurance were also eligible for tax relief. 
 
Table 4 shows the sources of financing for health expenditure for the year 2000. We 
see that the majority of healthcare spending is funded by the government (72.4 per 
--  12cent). Out-of-pocket payments made up 13.5 per cent of healthcare spending and 
private insurance covered nearly 8 per cent.  
Table 4: Sources of Financing of Health Expenditure in Ireland, 2000. 
Finance Source  % of Health Expenditure
Government 72.4%
Social Security Schemes  0.9%
Out-of-pocket payments  13.5%
Private Insurance  7.6%
All Other Private Funds  5.6%
Source:OECD Health Data 2002 4th ed. 
 
We first apply the insurance-based approach and attribute a value to the health 
transfers made. Table 5 shows the value of the healthcare transfer made by income 
quintile. The value of the transfer is greatest for the lowest income quintile, falling 
somewhat for each higher quintile. The income share of the bottom two quintiles 
increases slightly if the “health transfer” is included as a part of income. There is a 
slight fall in the income share of the third and fourth quintiles but the income share of 
the top quintile remains unchanged.  
 















   €  €  €       
1 121.80  44.94  166.74 8%  10% 
2 198.50  40.43  238.93  13%  14% 
3 275.47  38.00  313.47  18%  18% 
4 363.93  36.30  400.23  24%  23% 
5 584.38  34.27  618.65  38%  36% 
          
Total 309.07  38.78  347.84  20%  20% 
 
All of the poverty and inequality measures listed in Table 6 show a fall if the health 
transfer is included as part of income. The fall in the poverty indices is particularly 
--  13marked, with a reduction of between one-third and half for the poverty rate (head 
count measure) and the depth and distribution sensitive measure respectively. 
 
Table 6: Impact of Health Expenditure on Inequality of Resources. 
  Value of the Index  
 





Gini 0.302 0.264 -12.6% 
Atkinson 0.5  0.074 0.056 -23.7% 
Atkinson 1.5  0.247 0.158 -36.0% 
Poverty Rate (FGT0)  0.219 0.148 -32.4% 
Normalised Poverty Gap (FGT1)  0.053 0.030 -43.2% 
FTG2 (Depth and distribution 
sensitive measure)  0.019 0.009 -51.9% 
 
As noted above, the insurance-based approach used here still has some of the 
drawbacks associated with the “actual use” approach (cf Radner, 1997). This 
approach overstates the welfare of the elderly in particular, as it attributes high 
benefits to them but does not take account of their greater health needs.  
 
An alternative is to focus on those elements of health system that do genuinely affect 
the distribution of resources and welfare. Chief among these is the medical card 
system, which uses a means-test to focus resources on low income families and 
individuals..
6 The medical card entitles the holder to free GP services, prescription 
medicines, in-patient hospital services, out-patient services, dental, optical and aural 
services, maternity and infant care services as well as some personal and social care 
services.  A means-test is carried out and those within the financial guidelines can 
receive a medical card. Those whose income falls above the guideline amount but for 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that, given the association between low income and ill-health, the health need of 
the medical card population is itself greater than that of the population not entitled to a medical card. 
We do not attempt to adjust for this difference, but results from Layte et al. (2007) indicate that the 
extent of the difference is far less than the age gradient in health need. Further adjustment for the 
income-health gradient would strengthen the conclusions arrived at here.  
--  14whom the cost of medical care would cause ‘undue hardship’ can also be entitled to a 
medical card. We focus on the 35 per cent of the population who receive a medical 
card and use the cost per capita basis to attribute a value to them. This is done by 
taking the total spent per capita in 2000 by the government on the medical card 
scheme (reducing the amount spent on drugs and medicines in line with that allowable 
under the Drugs Payment Scheme which is open to all non medical cardholders). A 
more detailed breakdown of spending on the General Medical Service (GMS)_is 
shown in the appendix. Table 7 shows the percentage of households who have one or 
more residents covered by a medical card by income quintile.  As expected medical 
card coverage is concentrated in the lower income quintiles and falls as we move up 
the income distribution.  
 
Table 7: Medical Coverage by Quintile 
Quintile 
% of Households Covered 







Table 8 shows us the income shares per quintile before and after the medical card 
value is taken into account. The income shares of the lower quintiles increase with a 
reduction in the middle and top quintile. We see very small increases (less than half a  
per cent) in the equivalised disposable income of the top two quintiles, while the 
bottom and second quintile see average increases of 11.9 and 4 per cent respectively. 
 







% Change in Equivalised 
Disposable Income
           
1 7.8% 8.6% 11.9%
2 12.9% 13.2% 4.0%
3 17.9% 17.5% 1.6%
4 23.6% 23.5% 0.5%
5 37.8% 37.3% 0.1%
Total 100% 100% 1.9%
 
Table 9 shows the inequality and poverty indicators before and after the transfer is 
taken into account.  A fall is observed in all the inequality and poverty indices, in 
particular those more sensitive to changes at the bottom of the distribution (Atkinson 
measure with an index value of 1.5, and the FGT poverty measures). 
 
Table 9 : Impact of Medical Card Expenditure on Inequality of  Resources 







Gini 0.302 0.288 -4.6%
Atkinson 0.5  0.074 0.067 -9.3%
Atkinson 1.5  0.247 0.207 -16.1%
FGT0 0.219 0.189 -13.7%
FGT1 0.053 0.039 -25.6%
FGT2 0.019 0.013 -32.8%
 
--  165. Education 
The Irish educational system is organised into three levels: 
•  Primary schooling operates on an eight-year cycle, typically from age 5 to age 
12. Primary schooling is compulsory.  
•  Second level schooling is compulsory for three years (the “Junior Cycle” or 
lower secondary), with a “Senior Cycle” (upper secondary) typically taking a 
further three years.  
•  Third level education includes university primary degree courses (of 3 or 4 
years duration), diploma courses of shorter duration, and postgraduate 
qualifications  
We exclude the compulsory education years from our analysis, as it can be argued 
that the fact that education in these years is compulsory implies that the transfer of 
resources simply corresponds to a socially defined “need” for education. (See Section 
2 for details). Thus our analysis focuses on attributing benefits from free second level 
education and free third level education. It is well established that there are wage 
premia arising from participation in upper second level, and especially third level: 
Ireland is no exception in this regard (see, for example,  Callan and  Harmon, 1999). 
One could, therefore, seek to attribute the benefit of educational services provided to 
the individual, who will benefit from them in the labour market. This is an important 
perspective, but one which is  very demanding from the point of view of data – in 
principle it would require a picture of lifetime earnings. But there is another 
perspective, which is that benefit is also derived by parental households, who might 
otherwise pay fees for these educational services. Furthermore, to the extent that 
children end up in similar locations in the income distribution to their parents, 
attribution of benefits to the parental household can arrive at a similar outcome to the 
dynamic perspective.
7
                                                 
7 Where parents and children end up in dif ferent locations in the in come distribution, one may note 
that if an individual from a poor household obtains a third level education, and consequently a higher 
income than his/her parents, this benefit under our analysis is attributed to poor  households -  
--  17 
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As can be seen from the graph above government expenditure on third level education 
increased greatly in 1995 with the abolition of fees for undergraduate courses.  The 
table below shows the effect the inclusion of non-compulsory education has on 
various inequality and poverty measures.  
Table 10 shows the changes in income shares per quintile once non-compulsory 
education is taken into account. We observe a rise in income shares of the bottom two 
quintiles with a slight fall in income share for the top quintile.  Although the bottom 
two quintiles see increases in equivalised disposable income of 3.9 and 4.6 per cent 
the third and fourth quintiles also benefit with increases of more than two per cent. 
The top quintile sees an increase of around one per cent. 
 






% Change in Equivalised 
Disposable Income 
1 7.80% 8.00% 3.90% 
2 12.90% 13.10% 4.60% 
3 17.90% 17.90% 2.40% 
4 23.60% 23.60% 2.10% 
5 37.80% 37.40% 0.90% 
Total 100% 100% 2.20% 
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Table 11 shows the impact spending on non-compulsory education has on inequality 
and poverty indicators. We see relatively small falls in all the indicators. 
 
Table 11: Impact of Non-Compulsory Education Expenditure on Inequality of 
Resources. 










Gini 0.302 0.297 1.70%
Atkinson 0.5  0.074 0.072 3.20%
Atkinson 1.5  0.247 0.242 1.90%
FGT0 0.219 0.212 3.30%
FGT1 0.053 0.051 3.40%




6. Non-cash resources and the distribution of economic welfare: combined 
results 
Table 12 shows the changes in income shares per quintile when we take into account 
imputed rent, medical card expenditure and non-compulsory education provision. 
Overall we see the largest increase in equivalised disposable income in the bottom 
quintile and the smallest increase in the top quintile, the increase falling consistently 
as we move up the income distribution. We can therefore say that the non-cash 
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1 7.8% 9.0% 33.2%
2 12.9% 13.5% 20.7%
3 17.9% 17.9% 14.1%
4 23.6% 23.3% 12.6%
5 37.8% 36.4% 9.0%
Total 100%  100% 14.2%
 
 
As we can see from Table 13 all the inequality and poverty measures listed all fall by 
substantial amounts, in particular those sensitive to movements at the bottom of the 
income distribution. 
 
Table 13: Impact of All Transfers on Inequality of Resources 
Inequality and 
poverty indices  Value of the Index    
  
   Pre transfers  Post Transfers  Change
Gini 0.302 0.276 -8.6%
Atkinson 0.5  0.074 0.061 -16.9%
Atkinson 1.5  0.247 0.173 -30.0%
FGT0 0.219 0.163 -25.5%
FGT1 0.053 0.032 -39.6%
FGT2 0.019 0.010 -47.1%
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7. Conclusions 
Non-cash benefits can have substantial effects on the distribution of economic 
welfare. Standard approaches, however, have failed to take adequate account of the 
pattern of needs associated with the greater use of health and education services. Our 
results, for Ireland in the year 2000, show that it is possible to derive more appropriate 
measures of total resources than have been derived using standard methods. The 
results indicate that, as far as health, education and imputed rent are concerned; the 
overall pattern of redistribution is “pro-poor”. 
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Valuation Methods & Workings 
 
--  26 
Imputed Rent: 
There are three methods for calculating imputed rent; the market rent approach, the 
opportunity cost approach and the capital market method.  The market rent approach 
looks at the rent paid on similar dwellings and attributes this value to imputed rent. 
The opportunity cost approach is similar but deducts owner related costs (such as 
interest, maintenance costs etc.) from the rental cost of similar properties. Finally, the 
capital market method recognises that investment in property results in the owner 
foregoing other investment opportunities that result in real income flows such as 
dividends from shares, interest from savings, etc.  The capital market approach 
calculates a value for imputed rent by applying an ‘interest rate’ to the net equity 
value of the house (i.e. the market value of the house minus the outstanding mortgage 
amount, if any.)  
Due to the small number of private renters in the sample (see table 1 below), standing 
at only 6.2%, computing an accurate imputed rent figure using the market rent or 
opportunity cost approach would be difficult and unreliable. Therefore, we have used 
the capital market approach. For the purpose of our analysis we adopt a rate of 3% in 
line with the rate chosen under the AIMAP (Accurate Income Measurement for the 
Assessment of Policies) project to facilitate cross-country comparison. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Tenure, Living in Ireland 2000. 
Tenure % 
Own outright  39.7 
Own with mortgage  44.8 
Local authority tenant  7.7 
Private tenant  6.2 
Other 1.6 
All 100.0 
Note: Sample size for Living in Ireland Survey was 3,463 households 
 
Due to the small number of local authority tenants in the sample (7.7%) and issues 
involved that can make it difficult to value the property (thus calculating the net 
equity value needed under the capital market approach) we focus only on owner-
occupiers. In doing this we calculate an imputed rent figure for more than 90 per cent 
--  27of the sample. As can be seen from table 2 the percentage increase in equivalised 
disposable income is highest for the poorer quintile and decreases as we move up to 
the higher quintile. As eligibility for local authority housing is income dependent 
inclusion of an imputed rent value for local authority tenants would reinforce this 
trend of larger gains for lower income quintiles. This is shown in table 2 below where 
we see that the vast majority of social housing tenants are found in the bottom 
quintiles. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of tenure within quintiles of disposable income 










Rent free/ employer/ 
family 
    %  %  %  %  % 
  Bottom  44.0  23.8  23.1  7.2  1.8 
   2.00  44.1  40.0  9.5  5.2  1.2 
   3.00  42.2  46.9  4.5  4.2  2.2 
   4.00  38.4  52.8  1.6  5.9  1.3 
   Top  29.7  60.1  .1  8.5  1.6 
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We value two aspects of healthcare in this paper- firstly, the traditional approach of 
attributing all healthcare spending to Irelands citizens and secondly, focussing on 
medical card spending. When looking at all healthcare spending we compute a value 
for various age groups calculated using public health care expenditures derived from the 
OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). It encompasses expenditure on in-patient 
care, ambulatory medical services and pharmaceutical goods but does not include 
non-reimbursed individual health expenditures or cash benefits related to sickness.  
As can be seen in figure 1 below, using the insurance-based approach, healthcare 
spending per capita increases with age, rising sharply above the age of 60.   




























We then go on to look at the income-contingent medical card. Using the cost per 
capita approach we attribute a value to each medical cardholder. In 2000, 1,148,055 
people (including dependants) were covered by the medical card scheme (35 per cent 
of the population). We took the total spending under the GMS (General Medical 
Services scheme) for the year 2000, as shown below in table 3.  
 
--  29Table 3: GMS spending in 2,000-Total & per Medical Card Holder. 
   2000 
   €m 
Doctors Fees     113.88 
Allowances     56.05 
Pharmacists Fees & Mark-up     131.99 
Drugs & Medicines  395.61  
Reduction as per DPS eligibility
1 (75.76) 319.85 
Dentists     38.07 
Investment In General Practice Development     10.22 
High Tech Drugs Scheme     
Payment to Wholesalers     48.85 
Patient Care Fees paid to Pharmacists     3.05 
Optometrists     8.69 
Administration     11.78 
   Total Payments for the Year    
  
742.43 
Total # of Medical Card Holders (incl. dependants)     1,148,055 
Annual value per medical card holder     €646.68 
 1 €140.7m was spent under the Drugs Payment Scheme in 2000. All non-medical 
cardholders are entitled to claim under the DPS; therefore we calculated the average 
spending per person eligible under the DPS and reduced the cost of drugs and 
medicines by this amount per medical cardholder. 
 
We then attributed this annual value of the medical card to each holder (and all 
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Education: 
In order to maintain cross-country comparability we use the OECD ‘Education at a 
Glance’ figures in our analyses.  We exclude spending on research and development, 
which inflates the value of third level education per recipient. In our computation of 
the value of primary, secondary and tertiary we use the cost per capita basis. This 
equates to an annual value per student of €3,291 for primary students, €4,407 for 
secondary students and €4,687 for third level students. As we are focussing on non-
compulsory education only we look at the senior cycle of secondary school and third 
level education. If a household member falls in the 16-18.5 age category they are 
given the value for secondary level education. From the age of 18.5-22.5 they are 
given the value of third level education. 
 
Table 4: Public Expenditure per Student by Education Level. 
Education 
Level 
Average Public Expenditure per 
Student (OECD) 
€  Per annum 
Age Group 





Tertiary 4,687  18.5-22.5  years 
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